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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PETERSEN ELECTRIC, INC.,

Plaintiff and Appellee

vs.

Case No. 920170-CA

DAVID R. WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant
REPLY BRIEF

Appellant

David

R.

Williams

("Williams")

hereby

respectfully submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of Appellee,
Petersen Electric, Inc. ("Petersen") as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In the Brief of Appellee, Petersen attempts to cast
Williams1 Arguments as assertions that Williams is disputing the
lower court's Findings of Fact.

In order that there be no

misunderstanding, Williams believes that for purposes of the
arguments contained in his briefs, he can accept all the Findings
1

of Fact of the lower court which are indeed Findings of Fact.
Williams believes his arguments rest solely on errors of lav/
contained in the judgment of the lower court.
To the extent this Court determines it is necessary to
reach a finding of fact, then Williams challenges the findings of
fact to be contrary to the evidence.

ARGUMENT
WILLIAMS DOES NOT CHALLENGE ANY LOWER COURT
FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT ONLY CONTENDS THE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE MISAPPLIED TO THE
FACTS.
Petersen has wrongly attempted to characterize certain
legal conclusions as Findings of Fact.

In addition, Petersen has

misrepresented that the lower court's findings contain a finding
determining the intention of the parties (and therefore determining
a contract provision or a course of practice between the parties)
about when the bills or invoices were due. The lower court made no
such finding, nor could it.

A.

Even

The lower court determination of when the statute of
limitations begins to run is a conclusion of law.

though

the

lower

court

found

that

the bills

(invoices) were calculated on a "time and materials" basis and
2

accepted the billings (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16) into
evidence, the lower court did not find or conclude, nor could it,
that such billings are a part of the contract between the parties.
The conclusion of the lower court that the payment was not "due and
payable until the 10th of the month following billing," is not
properly a finding of fact, but a conclusion of law based upon the
billing

statement

prepared

by

Peterson, never

agreed

to by

Williams, and never found by the lower court to be a part of the
contract between the parties.
As discussed in Williams' opening brief, because the
bills or invoices cannot be a part of the contract between the
parties, as a matter of law, the language of the invoice which
allows payment by the 10th of the following month is certainly not
a part of the contract, not binding upon Williams, and does not
determine the running of the Statute of Limitations.
Appellee first contends that Judge Hanson found the
parties intended that payment was not due until the 10th of the
following month and Petersen erroneously refers to Finding of Fact
No. 10 as contained in an earlier version.
Page 10).

(See Brief of Appellee,

The correct finding is No. 9 as submitted in the latest

version of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 349).

Neither Finding No. 9 or No. 10 contain a finding about the
intention of the parties nor do they mention or determine a
3

contract provision.
Judge Hanson made no such finding. The lower court made
no finding of fact at all about the intentions of either party
concerning when the payments were due.

Not one of the bills,

statements or invoices which are in question were signed by
Williams or found to be part of any contract.

See copies of the

Memorandum Decision attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

In

addition, there is no testimony or evidence in the record which
supports the argument that the bills or the payment due* provision
became a part of the contract.
Also contrary to Petersen's assertion, Williaims usually
did obtain a quote or estimate from Petersen on the expected amount
that would be due for the work and materials.

See R. 466, lines

18-20, R. 524, lines 20-24, R. 526, lines 17-25 and R. 547, lines
17-25.
Petersen next contends that Williams was "not in breach"
until after the billing was sent and through the 10th of the
following month and that Petersen's billing was a "condition
precedent" before Williams could breach the agreement. (Brief of
Appellee, Page 13)

This Argument only begs the issue of what the

contract of the parties was. The contract between the parties did
not provide when payment was due nor for conditions precedent and,
4

therefore, by implication, inference and contract law, payment was
due upon delivery or completion of the work (See Appellant's Brief
Pg. 7-9). Petersen could have presented a bill the day each job
was complete and required payment, but did not.

William's non-

payment or refusal to pay at any time after completion was a breach
of the agreement.
William's defense was not, as next asserted by Petersen,
that he required a bill before being legally obligated to pay. On
the contrary, Williams defense was that such a long a time had
elapsed without a bill and Petersen's records were so poor, that by
the time a bill was sent, neither Petersen nor Williams could
remember or determine the fairness or accuracy of the billings. (R.
524, lines 6-10).
Next, Petersen contends that the twenty year course of
dealing or practice between the parties was evidence that the
billings were in fact due and payable on the 10th day of the
following month, but Petersen fails to also point out that during
the twenty year period, Mr. Williams had only made his payments in
trade.

There was no course of conduct or practice which occurred

or existed regarding when the bills were due or actually paid.
Because of the disputes which arose over the bills, the parties had
never agreed about when payment was to be made.
On Page 16 of its Brief, Petersen argues that William
5

Feinstein Brothers, Inc. v. L.Z. Hotte Granite, Co,, 184 A.2d 540
(Vermont 1962) stands for the proposition that the issue of when
payment was due is a question of fact and not of law.

Petersen's

analysis falls short of thoroughly examining the issues of this
case.

It is true that the question of when payment is due is a

question of fact when the contract of the parties or conduct of the
parties (which is binding on both) deals with or determines when
payment is due. The Court then properly "finds" what the contract
provides about the due date.

If, however, the contract does not

provide for a date payment is due and the conduct of the parties,
does not specify a date for payment, then the law provides, as a
conclusion of law, that payment is due upon completion of the
contract.

(See Brief of Appellant at Pages 7-9).
Williams expectations about the bills are not a part of

the contract.

Williams expected a bill because he was very

concerned about the accuracy of the bills, to verify the exact
amount for payment, and to know how the amount was calculated from
the itemization of work, labor and materials.

(R. 555, lines 2-

18) .
The contract between Williams and Petersen is not a
credit sale.

There is no testimony or evidence in the record

below, no finding or conclusion, that demonstrates a contract for
credit sale existed, that credit was approved, that Williams agreed
6

to any sort of interest rate or payment terms as to amount,
periodic payment or any other like term normally associated with
credit sales.
In this case, the law requires payment be due upon
completion or delivery and the statute began to run immediately.
Therefore, all work completed prior to October 3, 1985, four years
prior to the filing of this lawsuit required that Plaintiff's
action be filed before such dates and cannot now be collected
because of the four year statute of limitations.
To the extent the lower court found that a contract
provision existed for payment to be due only from the 10th of the
following month after billing, Williams challenges such finding as
contrary to the evidence.

B.

Williams1 agent had apparent authority to purchase
material from Petersen, as found by the lower court,
but could not lawfully vary the terms of the original
Agreement•
In it's Brief, Petersen erroneously asserts that Williams

is requesting this Court to overturn the Finding of Fact of the
lower court that William's agent, Don Lloyd, had apparent authority
to purchase the new generator.

See Finding of Fact No. 7 at R.

348.
Williams, in its brief, (Pages 12-20) does not contend
7

that the lower court finding that Lloyd had apparent authority is
incorrect, but only that under the facts and law of this case,
Lloyd had no authority to vary the terms of the original agreement
between Petersen and Williams. In other words, the lower court is
mistaken on the law in concluding that Lloyd had authority to
purchase a new generator for Williams when such had the effect of
modifying a previous agreement of his principal with the same
party.
The original agreement between Petersen and Williams in
regard to the generator is found in the testimony of both Petersen
and Williams:
Petersen testified at trial as follows:
Q. I would like to know what your memory is of the
conversation.
A.

David said, Go ahead and rebuild the old generator.

Q. Is that your memory of the conversation with Mr.
Williams?
A. Yes. That was prior to us finding out when the
armature was burnt.
Q.

He said to go ahead and repair the old generator?

A.

Rebuild the old generator.

Q. Do you remember if you quoted him a price in that
conversation?
A.

Yes, I know I did.

R. at 466, lines 9-20.
8

At trial David Williams testified as follows:
Q. Will you relate what the substance and effect of that
conversation was?
A. Mr. Petersen told me that he felt that it was going
to cost between $800.00 and $900.00 to repair my generator.
I told him, okay, go ahead and repair the generator that I
needed the generator fixed. So he said, all right, he would
go ahead and get started on it.
Q. Did he relate to you what he was going to do to
repair it?
A. Well, he told me he was going to tear — he was in
the process of tearing the generator down, and that, in
looking at what needed to be done, that it was going to cost
around $800.00 to $900.00 to fix. Did I want to go ahead and
have it fixed? And I told him, yes, I did.
Q.

Anything else about that conversation?

A. No, that!s pretty well all that was said, other than
he told me he would get right on it and get it out to us.
Record at 531, lines 1-17.
Thus there was a clear understanding between Petersen and
Williams himself on the rebuilding of the old generator and even
though the agent Lloyd had authority to purchase from Petersen as
found by the lower court, Lloyd could not vary the terms of an
existing agreement.

See Brief of Appellant at pages 15-20.

The purchase of a new generator would be a modification
of the original
generator.

agreement with Williams to rebuild

the old

Mac Petersen knew that to rebuild a generator was a

completely different proposition from purchasing a new one.
Petersen

insisted on the term

Mac

"rebuild" in his testimony in
9

response to questioning about the original conversation (R. 466).
Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam Webster, Inc.,
Page 982 (1991) defines "rebuild" as follows:
repairs" and "to reconstruct".

"to make extensive

Petersen was completely aware of

the original agreement.
Mac Petersen knew that only one generator was needed by
Williams or why else would he attempt to falsify an invoice to show
a rebuilt generator and misrepresent the fact so Williams would not
know he was receiving a new generator.
The lower court reviewed the falsification of the invoice
for the generator as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q. Do you have the original documents on Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 3?
That's the one that had to do with the
transformer or transmitter.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Can I see those, please?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. I am still a little confused on this generator, where*
you used the new generator and sent out the new billing.
That's Exhibit No. 15. I believe your testimony was that you
prepared an original invoice that showed a new generator.
That was the second page of your Exhibit No. 15. Do you have
that?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Then based upon the request, as indicated on the top
10

of the paper here, Don asked you to rewrite the invoice.
A. To make it look like we did rebuild the old one.
Yes, sir.
Q. Did you understand that was important for the purpose
of Mr. Lloyd showing that to Mr. Williams, so that Mr.
Williams would think the generator was rebuilt, rather than
buying a new one? Is that what the purpose of this, of Mr.
Lloyd represented to you as to why he wanted this redone?
A.

To save Don's skin, yes, sir.

Q.

It was to save Don's skin with his boss?

A.

Right.

At his request, I did this.

Q.
Obviously, at that point in time you understood that
at least in that particular instant Don Lloyd was not working
in the best interest of Mr. Williams, if he was going to trick
him?
A.
As I stated, I believe he made a decision that was
in the best interest for Mr. Williams.
Q.
I understand all that. I don't have any problem
with that. What I want to know is, at this point in time,
where this invoice was redone, to show it was a repaired
generator, as opposed to a new one, that was done by a person
who was an employee of Mr. Williams, but you knew at that
point in time the employee was requesting that change so he
could represent something that was not true to Mr. Williams;
is that right?
A.
So Mr. Williams wouldn't think that he made the
decision to buy a new one, and overrode Dave's decision.
That's what I would have to assume, yes, sir.
Q.
Have you ever done that in any other circumstance,
where an employee has asked you to change an invoice, so that
the boss won't know what you really got?
A.

Never, no, sir.

481-83).
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Thus Petersen knew of the original agreement and let
Lloyd stumble into a trap in asking for the new generator•
It is irrelevant to the issue of contract law, as is
advanced by Petersen, what the "economic sense or advisability" or
value of the original contract was to Williams.

Parties are held

to their contracts not based upon a determination of "economic
sense or advisability", but on the theories of consideration, a
meeting of the minds, and mutuality.

Williams agreed to pay for a

repaired generator and Petersen agreed to repair the same. (R. 466
and 531).

The price changed as new difficulties were discovered

with the repair of the generator, but no evidence was presented to
the Court nor found by it to demonstrate Williams had ever agreed
to other than the repair of the old generator.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is incumbent
upon third parties who deal with principals and agents to determine
if indeed the* principal is agreeable to a change in the terms of
the

contract,

which

Petersen

failed

to

do.

(See

Brief

of

Appellant, Pages 12-20).
Petersen

is not an innocent third party because

(1)

Petersen was aware of the terms of the original agreement and did
not determine for itself whether Williams had agreed to a change in
such terms and (2) Petersen conspired with the agent to alter and
misrepresent a sale of the new generator to Williams. (R. 476,
12

lines 10-17 and R. 481-83).
Therefore, Williams should not be bound to the agreement
entered into by the agent to purchase the new generator.
Should this court determine that the lower court's
finding (that the agent Lloyd had authority to purchase the new
generator) is correct and controlling, then Williams challenges
such finding on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence
presented below.

As stated above, Petersen had knowledge through

its agents of the original agreement to repair the generator and
the falsification of the invoice misrepresented the facts to
Williams. Under such circumstances the agent Lloyd could not have
had authority to bind the Principal.

See Appellants Brief Pages

15-20.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Williams does not seek to overturn the
lower court Findings of Fact. The determination by the lower court
that the bills were due from a certain day is in actuality a
conclusion of law which the lower court erroneously applied to the
facts of this case.

The finding that the agent, Don Lloyd had

apparent authority to act for Williams does not give Lloyd the
legal authority to alter the terms of the previous agreement, which
under law as an agent he could not do.
To the extent this Court determines the Findings of Fact
13

in either issue (a contract provision controlling when payments
were due and what authority the agent Lloyd possessed) determine
the result in this case, then Williams challenges such findings as
contrary to the evidence presented below.
The lower court decision should be reversed and Williams
should only be found to be indebted to Petersen in that amount
equal to work performed within the four year statute of limitation.

DATED this ^^ ^aay of October, 1992.
SNOW, HUTCHISON & NEIDER

x^-—=—
MICHAEL A. NEIDER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^^
day of October, 1992,
I mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief, postage prepaid, to the following:
Gregory M. Simonsen
175 South Main St., #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

14

Exhibits

Exhibit 1
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^ ^ ' * * l District

h

** * 1 fee,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PETERSEN ELECTRIC, INC.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

riaintlli,

S90906019 CV

vs,
DAVID R. WILLIAMS, dba
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., and GENERAL BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, dba KFAM RADIO,
Defendants.

The
trial,

above-referenced
and

concluded

matter

on

the

came
29 th

before
day

the

of

Court

January,

for
1991.

Following closing of the evidence and both sides resting, the
Court requested counsel to submit their closing arguments in
writing.

Counsel

submitted

their

closing

arguments

in

accordance with the Court's request, and the Court has now had
an opportunity to review its notes regarding the evidentiary
matters received during the course of trial, review carefully
the

exhibits

offered,

and

finally, review

carefully

closing

arguments of counsel on the issues presented during the course
of

trial.

The

Courr

being

following Memorandum Decision.

fully

advised,

then

enters

the

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

The ccise before the
plaintiff

against

the

Court

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

is primarily

defendant

for

a claim by the

electrical

goods

and

services supplied to the defendants over a substantial period
of time.

The defendant

resists

the

claim

asserted

by

the

plaintiff on a number of grounds, including claims that he is
entitled to certain setoffs, that the billings were untimely,
and that the claims
limitations.

asserted

are barred

by the

statute

of

Further, the defendant alleges that the amounts

billed are excessive, both in the amount of time expended and
the hourly rate charged.

Finally, the def€»ndant asserts that

there was no agreement to perform work in certain instances for
which the plaintiff seeks payment.
As to the claims of the plaintiff
amount of work performed

in general as to the

and the amount

charged, the Court

finds that the best evidence supports the factual finding and
the conclusions as suggested by the plaintiff that the work was
performed on a time and materials basis, as opposed to a firm
quote as suggested by the defendant.

The Court rejects the

defendant's argument that the estimates for the various work
constituted firm price commitments and quotations which would
bind

the

plaintiff.

The

Court

finds

that

the

defendant's

evidence on this issue is inconsistent and nonpersuasive.

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Turning to the issue regarding the time charged and the
amount charged for that time by the plaintiff

for the work

performed on the defendant's various projects, the Court finds
that the plaintiff's evidence on those issues shows that for
the work done, the time expended was reasonable and necessary
to perform the requested work, and that the work was performed
in conformity with the standards of practice for similar work
in this community.

Further, the Court is satisfied that the

evidence preponderates in favor of the finding, and the Court
does find that the hourly rate charged by the plaintiff and the
cost charges attributable to these jobs are appropriate and in
an amount which reflect a fair and reasonable charge for the
work accomplished.
On the issue of the generator, the Court finds that the
plaintiff
request

supplied

a new generator to the defendant at the

of defendant's

agent.

While the

defendant

disputes

that his agent had the authority to order a new generator,
there is no believable evidence that would

suggest that the

plaintiff had been made aware of the defendant's directions to
his agent at the time the order for the new generator was
placed.

Defendant's agent, when the order was placed for the

new generator rather than a rebuilt generator, had

apparent

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

authority to act on behalf of his principal, the defendant, and
the testimony shows that the ordering of a new generator was in
any event economically advisable when done.

Accordingly, if

the defendant has problems with the commitments made to third
parties, including the plaintiff, by the defendant's agent, the
defendant should look to his agent in that regard•
Turning to the issue regarding the Ensign Peak job, the
Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has met its burden of
proof on that issue, and that the plaintiff and the defendant,
once again through defendant's agent, agreed that the plaintiff
would perform the work that was ultimately performed at that
project

site.

Accordingly, the

issues

regarding

the

Ensign

Peak job are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the evidence
presented

by

the

plaintiff

being

the

most

believable

and

logical under the circumstances.
The defendant claims he is entitled

to certain seroffs.

The defendant's records, sparse as they are, do show that as of
March 26, 1984, the old debt that the defendant claims allows
him to have a setoff have been satisfied, at least to the
extent of a balance of $10.88 remaining to be paid from the
plaintiff to the defendant.
old

obligation

owed

by

Accordingly, as of that date, the

the plaintiff

to

the

defendant

had

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

effectively been
Based

upon

credits

the

after

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

zeroed through various

credit transactions.

foregoing
that

date

findings, there
to

which

the

is

no

legitimate

defendant

would

be

entitled.
With

respect

to

the

defendant's

claim

that

he

never

received any of the invoices representing the work done by the
plaintiff,

the

defendant's

lack

Court

finds

of

records

no

merit

shows

to

that

that
he

claim.

either

The

got

the

records and has now misplaced them, or got the records and was
not aware that they had been received.
plaintiff

shows that the

occasions

duplicate

request

of

invoices were mailed, and on many

copies

defendant's

The evidence from the

were

office

delivered,
help

misplaced or lost the original invoice.

that

based
they

upon

had

the

either

The Court is satisfied

that the plaintiff sent invoices on the work that had been
accomplished.
On the plaintiff's claim that it dealt with the defendant
on an open account, the Court is satisfied that the elements of
establishing
plaintiff.

an
The

open

account

evidence

is

have
not

not

been

convincing

met
and

by

the

does

not

preponderate in favor of the plaintiff that an open account had
been established

or maintained.

Accordingly, the statute of

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

limitations that would allow the recovery of invoices before
September

30,

1985

would

apply,

and

the

plaintiff

is

not

entitled to recover for those billings.
On the issue of the time for commencing

the statute of

limitations, the Court is satisfied that it should not change
its position as originally ruled in pretrial motions that the
statute of limitations commences to run at the time the bilLing
is made, and with respect to the question of delay in billing,
the

Court

is

satisfied

that

there

has

been

a

reasonable

explanation for the delay in billing offered by the plaintiff,
evidence which the Court finds believable, and the Ccan. is
further

satisfied

that

the

billings

were

made

within

a

reasonable time under the bases offered by the plaintiff for
delay in billing.

The Court finds no credible evidence that

the billing was unduly delayed so as no prohibit collection of
the invoices claimed to have been delayed.
The Court: finds that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
for the amounts reflected by Exhibit 3, 12, 12, 14, 15, lb, 17,
and 18, which total $13,424.74.
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff retains tne
generator which was to be sold to cne defendant, but refused.
The defendant

is entitled

to the generator, assuming

it is

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

PAGE SEVEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

still available, upon payment of the invoice, together with the
appropriate costs and expenses allowed under the invoice.

The

plaintiff has the option, however, of selling the generator in
a commercially reasonable manner, and retaining the proceeds
thereof, applying those proceeds towards a credit against the
Judgment which the Court will enter in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant in these proceedings.
The Court declines to revisit the question regarding the
statute of limitations as suggested by the defendant in its
closing argument Memoranda.
Counsel
Findings

of

for

the

Fact,

plaintiff

is

to

prepare

Conclusions

of

Law,

and

appropriate
Judgment

in

accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Decision, and submit
the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to the
Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated thi

.day of May, 1991.

M.
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS

PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum

Decision, to the following,,

this <^^_day of May, 1991:

Randall S. Feil
Gregory M. Simonsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Michael A. Neider
Attorney for Defendants
5286 South 320 West, Suite A-126
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

/%L

Exhibit 2

Gregory M. Simonsen (A4669)
Clark B. Fetzer (A1069)
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
7 00 Walker Center
17 5 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 3 55-15 03
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PETERSEN ELECTRIC, INC.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.

)

DAVID R. WILLIAMS dba INDUSTRIAL
COMMUNICATIONS, INDUSTRIAL
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and GENERAL
BROADCASTING CORPORATION dba KFAM
RADIO,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 890906019CV
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

)

The trial in the above-entitled case was tried to the Court,
sitting without jury, beginning January 25, 1991 and concluding
January 29, 1991.

The plaintiff was represented by Gregory M.

Simonsen and the defendants were represented by Michael A. Neider.
Prior to trial, the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment determining that as a matter of law, the
applicable point at which the statute of limitations commenced to
run is the time that plaintiff's bills became due and payable, net
the time that plaintiff first performed the work memorialized by
the invoices.

This issue (and others) was again briefed in trial

briefs submitted to tire Court before trial and in written closincr

argument.

At the trial, each of the parties presented witnesses

and the Court received written exhibits.

Thereafter, counsel

submitted closing argument in written form and the Court took the
matter under advisement.

The Court after having studied the trial

briefs, written closing arguments, exhibits, and after having
carefully consider the testimony of the witnesses made and entered
its decision in the case as recorded in the Memorandum Decision of
May

29, 1991.

The Court now makes and

enters the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation duly authorized to do

business in the State of Utah.
2.

Defendant David Williams is a resident of the State of

Utah, and is the owner of defendant Industrial Communications.
Industrial Communications has its headquarters and principal place
of business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

Industrial Communications incorporated in 1987, but prior

to that time was a sole proprietorship owned by defendant David
Williams.

All business transactions between the plaintiff and

defendants in this case were conducted prior to the time Industrial
Communications

filed

its

Articles

of

Incorporation

with

the

Secretary of State cf the State of Utah, and during the time

zhaz

Industrial Communications was a sole proprietorship owned by David
Williams.

4.
Radio.

Some of the invoices are from plaintiff to defendant KFAM
Agents of the plaintiff have testified, and the Court so

finds that plaintiff was told by defendants1 agent that KFAM Radio
was owned by defendant David Williams.

At all time relevant

hereto, plaintiff understood and believed that KFAM Radio was ov/ned
by

defendant

Communications.

David

Williams

as

was

defendant

Industrial

It was only after this litigation commenced in

1939 that plaintiff learned of defendantsr claim that KFAM Radio
is owned by a corporation named General Broadcasting Corporation.
General Broadcasting Corporation is a closely held corporation
ov/ned by defendant David Williams or David Williams and his wife.
Defendant General Broadcasting Corporation has the same business
address as Industrial Communications.

In view of these facts,

plaintiff reasonably believed that when it was doing business with
KFAM Radio, it was doing business with David Williams.
5.

Work was done and materials supplied by the plaintiff for

defendant Williams on a time and material basis and nor on a firm
quotation or bid method.

PLaintiff supplied the services and

materials reflected in the invoices and other documents contained
in Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, IS, 17 and IS, and has net been paid
for these goods or services.
6.
that

time

The time charged by plaintiff and the amount charged for
was

reasonable

requested by defendants.

and

necessary

zo

perform

the wcr>:

The work dene by plaintiff was performed

in conformity wich ~he standards of practice for similar wcr'.: in

this community and was done in a good and workman-like fashion.
The hourly rate charged by the plaintiff and the cost charges
attributable to these jobs are appropriate and in an amount which
reflect a fair and reasonable charge for the work accomplished.
The bills representing the work done by the plaintiff were sent to
defendants in the mail.

Duplicates were later delivered to the

defendants based upon the request of defendants1 office help.

The

bills were not unduly delayed so as to prohibit collection by the
plaintiff.

Any delays in billing were not unreasonable and were

satisfactorily and logically explained by the plaintiff during the
course of trial.
7.

One of the items plaintiff delivered to the defendants

was a new generator.

Defendants' agent ordered the generator on

behalf of the defendants and plaintiff reasonably believed that
defendants1 agent had authority to place the order. \ Ax. the time
the order was placed, defendants were unaware of any instructions
from defendants to their agent not to purchase a new generator.
Plaintiff relied upon the order placed by defendants' agent by
purchasing the generator from plaintiff's supplier. Plaintiff had
previous dealings with defendants' agent, in which nhe agent: had
been authorized to purchase materials on behalf cf defendants.
Defendants' agent had apparent authority

to act on behalf of

defendants in purchasing the generator.
8.

The defendants are net: entitled to any sat oiifs for

services or materials provided to the plainciff.

Ho services cr

materials were provided to plaintiff by defendants after March 26,
1984, when the balance owed by the plaintiff to defendants was
$10-88.
9.

Each of the invoices represented in Exhibits 3, 12, 13,

14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 were billed on September 30, 1985 or after.
The invoices did not become due and payable until the 10th of -the
month following billing.

Accordingly, the sums represented by

Exhibits 3, 12, 13 and 14 became due and owing on October 10, 198 5
or after; the sums represented by Exhibits 15 and 16 became due on
November 10, 1985 or after; and the sums represented by Exhibits
17 and 18 became due on August 10, 1986 or after.

The plaintiff's

action was filed with the Court on October 3, 1989.

Hence, each

of the invoices billed on September 30, 1985 or later is not barred
by the applicable four year statute of limitations.
10.
defendants

Although
did

defendants

not maintain

did
an

business

open

with

account

with

plaintiff,
plaintiff.

Accordingly, invoices billed prior to September 30, 1985 are barred
by the statute of limitations.
11.

With respect to the Ensign Peak

job, plaintiff

and

defendants agree that the plaintiff would perform the work that was
ultimately performed at the project site.

Plaintiff provided all

worker materials for the Ensign Peak job as set forth in Exhibit
18 and the previous finding that all work dene by the plaintiff
was dene in conformity with the standards of practice for sirilar

5

work in the community is also true with respect to the Ensign Peak
job.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Although all invoices in this case were billed to either

Industrial Communications or KFAM Radio, the debt owed is that of
defendant David Williams, because:
a.

During

Communications

the

was

a

time

in

registered

question
dba

of

David

Industrial
Williams.

Industrial Communications was incorporated until 1987 after
the invoices in this case had become due and owing;
b.

Neither David Williams or his agent:, Don Lloyd,

disclosed the identity or existence of General Broadcasting
Corporation.

Plaintiff

was

told

that.

Industrial

Communications and KFAM Radio were separate companies owned
by David Williams.

Defendants did not: disclose that KFAM

Radio was in fact: owned by General Broadcasting Corporation
which, in turn, was owned by Mr. Williams;
c.
sole

Plaintiff reasonably believed KFAM Radio to be a

proprietorship

of

defendant

David

Williams

as

was

Industrial Communications.
2.

Defendant David Williams breached his obligation to pay

plaintiff for goods and services causing plaintiff damage in tns
amounts set forth in Exhibits 2, 12, 12, 14, 13, 15, 17, and 12,

o

which total $13,424.74. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against
Mr. Williams for this amount.
3.

In addition to the amounts set forth in the previous

paragraph, plaintiff is entitled to interest prior to the entry of
judgment at the legal rate of 10% per annum, simple interest, from
the date each of the invoices became due and owing.

After the

entry of judgment, plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate
of 12% per annum until the judgment is satisfied.
4.

Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of damages or

judgment for its invoices billed prior to September 30, 1935,
inasmuch as those invoices are barred by the stature of limitations
set forth in § 73-12-25 of the Utah Code, the Court having found
that no open account existed.
5.

Plaintiff is entitled to keep possession of the generator

sold to defendants until such time as Mr. Williams pays the invoice
together with appropriate interest owned on the invoiced amount.
Plaintiff has the option, however, of selling the generator in a
commercially reasonable manner and retaining the proceeds thereof,
applying those proceeds towards a credit against the judgment to
be entered pursuant to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
6.

On the issue of the time for commencing the running of

the statute of limitations, the Court is net persuaded by the
further written and oral argument it has received en this matter,
that it should change its position as originally ruled in pretrial

motions that the statute of limitations commences to run after the
time the billing is made.

Accordingly, the Court declines to

revisit the question regarding

the statute of

limitations

as

suggested by the defendants.
7.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover it costs.

8.

Inasmuch

plaintiff's

as

complaint

the
as

judgment
to

the

is

against

other

Mr. Williams,

defendants

Industrial

Communications, Inc. and General Broadcasting Corporation should
be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of

, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
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